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According to the Sensitivity-to-mean-intentions model, dispositional victim sensitivity
involves a suspicious mindset that is activated by situational cues and guides
subsequent information processing and behavior like a schema. Study 1 tested whether
victim-sensitive persons are more prone to form expectancies of injustice in ambiguous
situations and whether these expectancies mediate the relationship between victim
sensitivity and cooperation behavior in a trust game. Results show an indirect effect of
victim sensitivity on cooperation after unfair treatment (vs. control condition), mediated
by expectancies of injustice. In Study 2 we directly manipulated the tendency to form
expectancies of injustice in ambiguous situations to test for causality. Results confirmed
that the readiness to expect unjust outcomes led to lower cooperation, compared to
a control condition. These findings provide direct evidence that expectancy tendencies
are implicated in elevated victim sensitivity and are of theoretical and practical relevance.
Keywords: expectancy tendencies, cooperation, trust, justice sensitivity, information processing
INTRODUCTION
People diﬀer systematically in their perceptions of as well as their emotional and behavioral
reactions to injustice (Schmitt, 1996). Social justice research has provided intriguing evidence
that individual diﬀerences in dispositional justice sensitivity (JS) are associated with reactions to
injustice (Schmitt et al., 2005, 2010). For example, JS has been found to shape anger, protest, and
retaliation in reaction to own disadvantages (Schmitt and Dörfel, 1999). One important dimension
of JS is the intolerance of unfair treatment directed toward the self, namely victim sensitivity.
Strikingly, high victim sensitivity was found to be associated with reduced willingness to cooperate
(Gollwitzer et al., 2009). For example, highly victim-sensitive persons were found to refrain from
displaying solidarity with disadvantaged others (Gollwitzer et al., 2005).
The Sensitivity-to-mean-intentions (SeMI) Model was proposed to explain this and similar
antisocial eﬀects of victim sensitivity by delineating the underlying processes that translate this
disposition into uncooperative behavior (Gollwitzer and Rothmund, 2009; Gollwitzer et al., 2013).
This account assumes that victim-sensitive persons have a generalized expectancy that others
harbor mean intentions. More precisely, the model proposes that victim-sensitive persons are
characterized by a suspicious mindset that is activated by contextual cues suggesting the intentional
meanness of others. Assumedly, the activated mindset guides information processing and behavior
like a schema and consists of three components: hostile interpretations, the motivation to avoid
exploitation, and cognitions legitimizing one’s own antisocial behavior. Here we focus on hostile
interpretations, and more speciﬁcally, on expectancies of injustice in ambiguous situations.
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Until now, there has been only indirect evidence that victim-
sensitive persons have heighted expectancies of others mean
intentions, and that this processing pattern is responsible for
their reluctance to cooperate in socially uncertain situations.
We argue that it is crucial to assess such expectancies in
order to test whether they are indeed characteristic of persons
high (compared to low) in victim sensitivity, and directly
manipulate these expectancies in order to determine whether
they causally contribute to reduced behavioral cooperation when
the suspicious mindset is activated.
This research will enable a more detailed understanding
of victim sensitivity by clarifying the processes responsible
for its detrimental social eﬀects. Adopting a social-cognitive
approach makes it possible to move beyond the description
of interindividual diﬀerences toward explanation of the
mechanisms that give rise to phenomena, such as the withdrawal
of cooperation (Baumert and Schmitt, 2012). The resulting
knowledge can inform the development of eﬀective interventions
capable to enhance adaptive behavior in high victim-sensitive
persons, and so oﬀers the promise of yielding applied beneﬁts.
Expectancy of Injustice
The availability of hostile interpretations is seen as core to the
suspicious mindset in victim-sensitive persons. As described by
Fein and Hilton (1994): “after the activation of a suspicious
mindset, even slight or meaningless incidents become likely to
be interpreted as evidence for this person’s mean intentions”
(cited by Gollwitzer et al., 2013, p. 418). Moreover, in situations
where outcomes are uncertain, the activated suspicious mindset
triggers the expectancy that one will be unjustly disadvantaged
(Gollwitzer et al., 2013).
Indirect evidence that expectancies of injustice characterize
heightened victim sensitivity comes from studies assessing
behavior in uncertain social situations. An often-used paradigm
that includes such a situation is the so-called trust game (Berg
et al., 1995). In an adapted version of this game, participants
are faced with two ﬁnancial decisions in the role of anonymous
Persons A and B. Persons A and B receive an equal amount of
money from the experimenter. First, Person A is free to invest any
amount by transferring it to Person B. This investment is then
tripled by the experimenter. Second, Person B has two options:
to keep the tripled investment of Person A or to transfer back a
share of this investment to Person A such that both persons will
have the same outcome (Gollwitzer and Rothmund, 2011).The
ﬁrst decision in the role of Person A is a situation in which
the participant’s cooperation can be exploited by an anonymous
partner in the role of Person B. Thus, non-cooperation of the
Person A is taken to indicate the expectancy that Person B will
be uncooperative. The second decision in the role of Person
B is a situation, where participants are able to exploit the
cooperativeness of their anonymous partner in order to gain as
much money as possible. The focus in the present research is
on the decision in the role of Person A which will be termed
cooperation decision in the remainder of this paper.
Gollwitzer and Rothmund (2011, Study 2) used this version
of the trust game and found that victim-sensitive persons
reduced their cooperation in the role of Person A, when they
had previously been confronted with the selﬁsh behavior of
a diﬀerent interaction partner in an unrelated situation. The
authors conclude that the unfair disadvantage suﬀered prior
to the trust game led victim-sensitive persons to expect mean
intentions of the new interaction partner, and consequently
resulted in lower cooperation rates. These ﬁndings are consistent
with the idea that victim-sensitive persons have a heightened
tendency in ambiguous situations to expect that they will be
unfairly treated, in cases when their suspicious mindset was
activated by an unrelated situation. However, evidence from
this study (as well as similar studies by Gollwitzer et al., 2009
and Rothmund et al., 2011) is limited by the fact that the
association between expectancy tendencies and victim sensitivity
was not directly assessed, and so no conclusion about the exact
functioning of these expectancy tendencies can be drawn.
Baumert et al. (2012) directly assessed expectancy tendencies
and found that high (vs. low) victim-sensitive persons exhibited
heightened anticipation of unjust (but also just) outcomes in
ambiguous situations. Expectancy tendencies were assessed by
means of a fragment completion task. High (vs. low) victim-
sensitive persons were faster to complete fragments that resolved
ambiguous passages to indicate an unjust or just outcome, rather
than providing a completion unrelated to justice. In contrast to
the assumptions of the SeMI model, the ﬁndings of the Baumert
et al. (2012) study suggest that victim-sensitive persons readily
form expectancies of both unjust and just outcomes in ambiguous
situations. However, in this study, a suspicious mindset was not
activated by confronting participants with cues of others’ mean
intentions prior to the assessment of expectancies. Baumert et al.
(2012) speculated that the situational activation of a suspicious
mindset may be necessary before the information processing of
victim-sensitive persons becomes biased toward expectancies of
unjust outcomes.
Thus, there is no direct evidence that expectancy tendencies
mediate the relationship between victim sensitivity and
reluctance to cooperate in situations when exposure to cues
signaling mean intentions permit activation of a suspicious
mindset.
The Present Research
In two studies we investigated the association between victim
sensitivity, expectancies of injustice, and reduced cooperation.
In Study 1, we adopted a moderated mediation approach to
compare eﬀects of victim sensitivity under conditions that did
or did not cue activation of a suspicious mindset. We employed
a precue procedure that exposed participants to unfair behavior
of an ostensible interaction partner (unfairness precue) or to a
fair outcome (control condition). Subsequently, we assessed the
tendency to form expectancies of unjust and just outcomes and
observed cooperative behavior in a trust game. Based on the
assumptions outlined above, the experienced unfairness should
activate a suspicious mindset in victim-sensitive but not in
insensitive persons, and subsequently guide the formation of
expectancies of injustice in ambiguous situations, resulting in
withdrawal of cooperation in the trust game.
To assess expectancies of injustice, we adapted a recognition
paradigm from research on anxiety (Mathews and Mackintosh,
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2000). Participants read scenarios that were left ambiguous
with regard to the outcome for the narrator. Each scenario
was presented with an identifying title. Afterward, participants
saw this title again, together with sentences that described
unjust and just alternative outcomes for the respective scenario.
Participants were required to indicate how well each sentence
ﬁt with the previously read scenario. It was assumed that
people would tend to resolve the uncertainty while reading
a scenario by anticipating a likely outcome (e.g., Simpson,
1981). Consequently, persons with a heightened tendency to
expect injustice would anticipate unjust outcomes while encoding
the original scenarios. Forming an unjust (just) interpretation
of the ambiguous scenario should lead to the endorsement
of sentences that described an unjust (just) outcome for the
scenario.
We predicted that in the unfair precue condition, but not in
the control condition, high (compared to low) victim-sensitive
persons would tend to expect unjust outcomes. We anticipated
no eﬀect of victim sensitivity on the expectancy of just outcomes.
Furthermore, we predicted that under activation of the suspicious
mindset the tendency to form expectancies of injustice would
mediate the expected relationship between victim sensitivity and
behavioral cooperation in the trust game.
Based on the results of Study 1, we experimentally
manipulated the tendency to form expectancies of injustice
by means of a training procedure in Study 2. This allowed
us to test the hypothesized causal role of unjust expectancies
in the proposed mediating process for cooperation behavior.
In a training procedure that we adapted from research on
anxiety (Mathews and Mackintosh, 2000) participants read
sentences that described situations permitting potentially
unjust or just outcomes. The last words of each sentence
resolved this ambiguity by communicating whether an unjust
or just outcome occurred. These ﬁnal words were presented
as fragments that the participant had to complete as quickly
as possible. In the unjust expectancy training condition, all
fragments resolved the ambiguity to indicate an unjust outcome.
By contrast, in the control condition, the sentences described
situations unrelated to justice and the fragments yielded ﬁnal
words unrelated to justice. After the training procedure, all
participants received additional fragments (probes) that resolved
ambiguous sentences in describing an unjust, just or neutral
outcome. The reaction times to complete these fragments
served as a measure to estimate the success of the training
manipulation.
It was intended that participants in the unjust expectancy
training condition would resolve the ambiguity while reading the
sentences and anticipate unjust outcomes. This acquired
readiness to form expectancies of injustice would lead
them to faster reactions (compared to control condition)
to solve the probes that yielded an unjust outcome (but
not just and neutral outcomes). Furthermore, regarding
cooperation in the trust game, we predicted that persons
in the unjust expectancy training condition (compared
to the control condition) would allocate less money to
their partners in the trust game, when in the role of
Person A.
Ethics Approval
These studies were carried out in accordance with the ethics
guidelines of the DGPs and the BDP (German Association of
Psychology) and approved by the local ethics commission of
the University of Landau. Participants provided their informed




Fifty-four undergraduate students (83% female; ages: 19–
47 years;M = 23.15; SD= 5.69) participated in a study ostensibly
on verbal abilities. In return for their participation, students
received 8€.
Procedure
In the ﬁrst weeks of the semester, students were invited
to complete a questionnaire containing personality measures,
including the JS scales. Several weeks later, the students
were invited to participate in an independent computer-based
laboratory experiment. Upon arrival, participants were seated
at one of four separated workplaces and randomly assigned to
either the unfair precue condition (n = 30), or to the control
condition (n = 24). After providing demographic information,
participants had to resolve an anagram task that served as precue
procedure and will be explained below. Subsequently, expectancy
tendencies were measured with a recognition paradigm and
participants made ﬁnancial decisions in a trust game. Finally,
manipulation checks were assessed and participants were fully
debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
Materials
All materials were provided in German language. For
comprehension we present own English translations.
Justice Sensitivity
The Justice Sensitivity Inventory (Schmitt et al., 2010) served
to measure victim sensitivity with 10 items (α = 0.90; e.g., “I
ruminate for a long time when other people are treated better
than me”). The response scales ranged from 0 (totally disagree)
to 5 (totally agree)1.
Precue procedure
Based on the procedure of Gollwitzer and Rothmund (2011,
Study 2), participants worked on a computer-based anagram task
for 1 min with an anonymous partner, supposedly participating
in the study simultaneously in another room. Participants were
instructed that they would receive credits, depending on their
and the other participant’s performance, and that the credits
would be transferred into raﬄes for the lottery of an iPod among
all participants after completion of data collection. Thus, their
chances to win the iPod would be higher the more credits they
earned. In order to raise the credibility of this procedure, we had
1Several other personality measures were administered. These are not relevant for
the present research questions and, thus, will not be analyzed in the present context.
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two experimenters, one of them changed between the rooms to
retrieve the information about the performance of the ﬁctitious
partner. However, this information was prepared so that the
partners’ performance was similar to that of the participant.
In the unfair precue condition, after learning about their
own and their partner’s performance, the participant was asked
to decide on the allocation of raﬄes among them. They
were told that their partner would take the same decision
simultaneously and that both decisions would be averaged to
determine the number of raﬄes that each person would receive.
One experimenter left the room to retrieve the partner’s decision.
Independent of their own decision, participants in the unfair
precue condition received the feedback that their ﬁctitious
partner had allocated 75% of the raﬄe tickets to him/herself.
By contrast, in the control condition, the whole amount of
obtained raﬄes was split equally between the two partners. To
visualize the allocation of raﬄes, every participant received a
predesigned sheet where the experimenter noted performances
and decisions.
Assessment of expectancies of injustice
The recognition paradigm to assess expectancies of injustice was
presented as a fragment completion task. It consisted of two parts,
an encoding phase and a recognition phase. In the encoding
phase, participants were instructed to actively take the perspective
of the narrator while reading passages with fragmented last words
that had to be completed as fast as possible.
They started with 30 fragment completion trials2 to get used
to the task. Participants were instructed to press a marked button
as soon as they knew the correct solution. With the key stroke,
they proceeded to the next screen where they typed in the missing
letters of the fragmented words. These initial 30 trials were
followed by 13 scenarios. The only noticeable diﬀerence for the
participants was that each of these scenarios was introduced by
an identifying title (in contrast to the previous trials). Half of
these scenarios3 described a situation, where the actual outcome
was left uncertain, and the last words of each scenario were
fragmented. For example:
“The presentation.
During the last weeks I worked overtime for my boss. Even
today, my colleagues went already home, while I still have to to
prepare a presentation. Now my boss is calling me for the ann_al
perso_nel ta_k. (correct fragment completion: annual personnel
talk).”
In the recognition phase, for each of the previously read
scenarios, the identifying title was displayed together with four
descriptions related to the content of the respective scenario. For
2Originally, these sentences were designed to assess spontaneous interpretations
of ambiguity by means of reactions times. Participants had to complete fragments
that were intended to yield either an unjust, just or neutral outcome (10 each) of
an ambiguous sentence. However, in an independent sample, fairness and valence
ratings of the supposedly unjust, just, and neutral outcomes were not suﬃciently
distinct. Therefore, we excluded this task from further analyses. Materials are
available upon request.
3It was counterbalanced across participants which speciﬁc scenario was structured
in a way that allowed to assess expectancy tendencies. For half of the participants,
six scenarios (for the other half 7) were ambiguous with regard to the outcome for
the narrator. The other scenarios reported negative outcomes for the narrator thus
not serving for the assessment of expectancy tendencies.
the relevant scenarios, four alternative outcomes were presented
that had been pretested in an independent sample4. Two
sentences described unjust, and the other two just outcomes for
the narrator. One of each type of sentence, the target, described
an unjust or just disadvantage and contained information that
corresponded to the initial scenario. For the above described
scenario they read as follows:
Although I am strongly committed, my boss accuses me of
insuﬃcient performance. (unjust target)
My boss promises me to pay my overtime work in the next
month because of my strong commitment. (just target)
The other of each type of sentence, the foil, described an unjust
or just disadvantage as well but contained information that was
false in the sense that it contradicted the information given in the
initial scenario. For the above described scenario, the foils were:
This week my boss gives me even more work to do and does
not invite me to the annual personnel talk. (unjust foil)
My colleagues are helping me to prepare the presentation that
I am free to go for the annual personnel talk. (just foil)
The foils served to disentangle the endorsement of
unjust targets, indicating expectancies of injustice, from the
endorsement of both, unjust targets and foils, indicating a
response bias to unjust outcomes in general. The four outcomes
for each scenario were presented one after another in random
order that was ﬁxed across participants. Participants were asked
to indicate for each sentence separately, how well it matched
the content of the corresponding scenario. Response options
ranged from 1 (does not match the scenario at all) to 6 (matches
the scenario very well).
Trust game
We used the modiﬁed trust game employed by Gollwitzer and
Rothmund (2011) to assess behavioral cooperation. Participants
were told that they would interact with another anonymous,
randomly chosen person that participated in the study but was
not present in the same session. The task was introduced in the
following way on the computer screen: Persons A and B receive
100 ct each and have to take two decisions. First, Person A is
free to invest any amount to Person B. This investment is tripled
by the experimenter. Second, Person B has two options: to keep
the tripled investment of Person A or to share with Person A
such that both receive the same outcome. Every participant took
both decisions (without knowing about the partner’s decisions),
but the dependent variable of interest was the decision in the
4The 52 outcome sentences for all 13 relevant scenarios were pretested by nine
independent raters (ages: 21–78 years; M = 37.1; SD = 21.3). Response scales
ranged from 1 (very unjust) to 6 (just). Unjust outcomes were rated signiﬁcantly
lower (M = 1.38; SD = 0.55) than just outcomes (M = 4.72; SD = 0.72),
t(8) = −8.52, p < 0.01, d = 5.67. When comparing targets and foils, in two
scenarios ratings diﬀered more than 2 SD from each other. Therefore, all sentences
belonging to these scenarios were excluded from further analyses. For the sentences
belonging to the remaining 11 scenarios, unjust targets (M = 1.33; SD = 0.64)
were rated similar to unjust foils (M = 1.43, SD = 0.52), t(8) = −0.90, p = 0.40,
d = 0.18, and just targets (M = 4.70; SD = 0.91) were rated similar to just foils
(M = 4.73; SD = 0.61), t(8) = −0.17, p = 0.87, d = 0.04. The main results of the
study remained similar, when including or excluding the two scenarios.
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role of Person A as index of behavioral cooperation. Participants
were informed that their decisions were about real money and
that, after the end of the study, three participants were chosen
randomly to receive their obtained money.
Manipulation checks
At the end, participants were asked about their perception of the
allocation of the lottery tickets in the anagram task, in order to
validate the eﬀectiveness of the precue manipulation of perceived
unfair vs. fair treatment. They rated eight items on a scale from
1 (totally disagree) to 6 (totally agree) to assess fairness (α = 0.76,
e.g., “The number of raﬄes I obtained was fair”).
To reiterate our hypotheses in Study 1, we predicted that in
the unfair precue condition, but not in the control condition,
high (compared to low) victim-sensitive persons would more
strongly endorse targets but not foils describing unjust outcomes
(Hypothesis 1A). We expected no eﬀect of victim sensitivity
on the endorsement of just targets or foils (Hypothesis 1B).
Furthermore, we predicted that, in the unfair precue condition
(but not in the control condition), there would be an indirect
negative eﬀect of victim sensitivity on the amount that each
participant transferred in the role of Person A in the trust
game, mediated by the endorsement of targets, indicating unjust
outcomes (Hypothesis 2).
Results
Correlations, means, and standard deviations of all variables are
reported in Table 1, separately for precue conditions. Regarding
the cooperation decision in the role of Person A in the trust
game, on average, participants transferred 81 ct (SD = 22.8) to
their interaction partners, with no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
average transfer rates in the unfair precue condition (M = 80.0,
SD = 23.0) and in the control condition (M = 82.0, SD = 23.0),
t(52) = −0.35, p = 0.73, d = 0.09.
Manipulation Checks
As expected, participants in the unfair precue condition perceived
the allocation of the lottery tickets in the anagram task as
signiﬁcantly less fair (M = 3.13; SD = 0.97) than participants
in the control condition (M = 4.51, SD = 0.66), t(52) = −5.90,
p < 0.01, d = 1.66.
Relationship between Victim Sensitivity and
Expectancy Tendencies
To test Hypothesis 1, we conducted separate moderated
regression analyses, with the endorsement of unjust and just
targets and foils as dependent variables, respectively. Condition
(dummy-coded: 0 = control condition; 1 = unfair precue
condition), z-standardized victim sensitivity, as well as the
interaction victim sensitivity × condition were entered as
predictors. The dependent variables remained in their metric.
Thus, we report semi-standardized B-weights.
Regarding the endorsement of unjust targets, the complete
regression model explained 12% of the variance, F(3,48) = 2.17,
p = 0.10. There were no signiﬁcant main eﬀects of condition,
B = −0.01, t(51) = −0.04, p = 0.97, or of victim sensitivity,
B = −0.27, t(51) = −1.00, p = 0.32. There was a signiﬁcant
interaction eﬀect of victim sensitivity × condition, B = 0.79,
t(51) = 2.26, p = 0.03, R2 = 0.09. In the unfair precue
condition, persons high in victim sensitivity endorsed unjust
targets signiﬁcantly more than did persons low in victim
sensitivity, B = 0.52, t(27) = 2.34, p = 0.03 (Figure 1). In
the control condition, there was no signiﬁcant relationship
between victim sensitivity and the endorsement of unjust targets,
B = −0.27, t(22) = −1.00, p = 0.33. An a posteriori power
analysis with Gpower (Faul et al., 2009) for the interaction eﬀect
revealed 1-β = 0.62 to detect an increase in R2 of 0.09.
For unjust foils, the complete regression model explained
9% of the variance, F(3,48) = 1.60, p = 0.20. There were no
signiﬁcant main eﬀects of condition, B = 0.20, t(51) = 0.92,
p = 0.36, or victim sensitivity, B = −0.11, t(51) = −0.52,
p = 0.60 and no signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect of victim
sensitivity × condition, B = 0.43, t(51) = 1.65, p = 0.11,
R2 = 0.05. Although the interaction eﬀect was not signiﬁcant,
it has to be noted that in the unfair precue condition, there
was a marginally signiﬁcant simple slope for the regression of
the endorsement of unjust foils on victim sensitivity, B = 0.32,
t(27) = 1.76, p = 0.09.
Regarding the endorsement of just targets, the complete
model explained 6% of the variance, F(3,48) = 0.94, p = 0.43.
There were no signiﬁcant main eﬀects of condition, B = 0.26,
t(51) = 0.77, p = 0.44, or victim sensitivity, B = 0.44,
t(51) = 1.45, p = 0.15 and no signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect
of victim sensitivity × condition, B = −0.23, t(51) = −0.89,
p = 0.38, R2 = 0.02. For the endorsement of just foils,
the complete regression model explained 4% of the variance,
F(3,48)= 0.69, p= 0.56. There were no signiﬁcant main eﬀects of
condition, B = 0.26, t(51) = 1.37, p = 0.18, or victim sensitivity,
B= −0.07, t(51)= −0.42, p= 0.67 and no signiﬁcant interaction
eﬀect of victim sensitivity × condition, B = 0.07, t(51) = 0.47,
p = 0.64, R2 = 0.004.
Effects of Victim Sensitivity on Cooperation Behavior
in the Trust-Game Mediated by Expectancy
Tendencies
As can be seen in Table 1, in the unfair precue condition, there
was no signiﬁcant bivariate correlation between victim sensitivity
and behavioral cooperation in the trust game (r = −0.31, n.s.).
Nevertheless, using the process tool for SPSS (Hayes, 2013), we
conducted moderated mediation analyses in order to test for an
indirect eﬀect of victim sensitivity on cooperation behavior via
expectancy tendencies, which we expected in the unfair precue
condition (Hypothesis 2). Further, we wanted to distinguish
the formation of expectancies of injustice from a response bias
regarding these processes’ potential relevance for behavioral
reactions. Therefore, we tested twomoderatedmediation models.
In both models victim sensitivity (z-standardized) served as
independent variable, condition (dummy-coded: 0 = control
condition; 1 = unfair precue condition) as moderator, and
investment in the role of Person A in the trust game as the
dependent measure of behavioral cooperation. In the ﬁrst model,
the endorsement of unjust targets was tested as mediator, in
the second model the endorsement of unjust foils. Results are
displayed in Figures 2 and 3.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 2059
Maltese et al. Expectancy Tendencies and Behavior
TABLE 1 | Correlation, mean, and standard deviation of all variables in the unfair precue condition and in the control condition in Study 1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unfair precue condition
(1) Victim sensitivity 1
(2) Cooperation −0.31 1
(3) Unjust target 0.41∗ −0.39∗ 1
(4) Unjust foil 0.32† −0.16 0.58∗∗ 1
(5) Just target 0.07 −0.17 −0.19 −0.36† 1
(6) Just foil 0.05 −0.01 0.13 0.34† 0.01 1
M 2.70 80.0 2.79 3.55 1.69 1.79
SD 0.89 23.3 1.11 1.19 0.89 0.63
Control condition
(1) Victim sensitivity 1
(2) Cooperation 0.55∗∗ 1
(3) Unjust target −0.21 −0.33∗∗ 1
(4) Unjust foil −0.14 −0.14 0.56∗∗ 1
(5) Just target 0.33 0.36† −0.44∗ −0.09 1
(6) Just foil −0.09 0.27 0.06 0.48∗ 0.31 1
M 2.77 82.2 2.93 3.14 1.52 1.50
SD 0.83 22.7 1.10 1.27 0.63 0.69
For Victim Sensitivity, response scales ranged from 0 (fully disagree) to 5 (fully agree).
Unjust target; just target = endorsement of unjust/just expectancies. Unjust foil; just foil = response bias. Response scales from 1 (does not match the scenario at all) to
6 (matches the scenario very well). Cooperation = amount of money (in Cent) transferred by Person A in the trust game.
†p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
FIGURE 1 | Endorsement of unjust targets dependent on victim
sensitivity and condition.
As predicted in Hypothesis 2, in the unfair precue condition,
there was a signiﬁcant negative indirect eﬀect of victim sensitivity
on cooperative behavior in the trust game mediated by the
endorsement of unjust targets, B = −3.68, SE = 2.28, 95% CI
[−9.87; −0.53]. In the control condition, this indirect eﬀect was
not signiﬁcant, B = 1.90, SE = 2.85, 95% CI [−1.52; 10.45].
Among persons who had been exposed to the unfair precue,
higher (compared to lower) victim-sensitive persons endorsed
unjust targets more strongly and, plausibly in consequence,
reduced their behavioral cooperation.
FIGURE 2 | Moderated mediation model for the interaction victim
sensitivity × condition on cooperation in the trust game, showing
B-weights and indirect effects for endorsement of unjust targets
(unjust expectancies) as mediator. ∗p < 0.05.
Importantly, the endorsement of unjust targets was
signiﬁcantly related to reduced behavioral cooperation,
B = −7.04, SE = 2.85, p = 0.02, which was not the case
for the endorsement of unjust foils, B = −4.68, SE = 4.10,
p = 0.26. Accordingly, there was no signiﬁcant indirect eﬀect of
victim sensitivity on behavioral cooperation via the endorsement
of unjust foils, neither in the unfair precue condition, B = −1.52,
SE = 1.92, 95% CI [−8.07; 0.38], nor in the control condition,
B = 0.49, SE = 1.12, 95% CI [−0.36; 5.11].
Discussion
In Study 1 we adopted a moderated mediation approach to
test whether victim sensitivity is related to the tendency to
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FIGURE 3 | Moderated mediation model for the interaction victim
sensitivity × condition on cooperation in the trust game, showing
B-weights and indirect effects for endorsement of unjust foils
(response bias) as mediator.
form expectancies of injustice, and whether this tendency
mediates behavioral cooperation. Results suggested that victim
sensitivity is related to a tendency to form expectancies of
injustice under the unfair precue condition. The interaction
of precue and victim sensitivity as well as the simple slope
in the unfair precue condition were only signiﬁcant regarding
the endorsement of unjust targets, and not foils (Hypothesis
1A). Thus, our ﬁndings were compatible with the conclusion
that, when the unfair precue had activated their suspicious
mindset, highly (compared to lowly) victim-sensitive persons
tended to form expectancies of unjust outcomes while reading
the ambiguous scenario in the encoding phase. Our ﬁndings
seem less compatible with the notion that JS involves a response
bias manifested in the endorsement of unjust outcomes in
the recognition phase, independent of whether these outcomes
contradicted information in the initial scenario or not.
However, given a marginal relation between victim sensitivity
and the endorsement of unjust foils in the unfair precue
condition, it cannot be precluded that victim sensitivity is as
well related to a response bias. For this reason, it was very
important to test not only unjust targets, but also unjust foils
as potential mediators on uncooperative behavior. These tests
allowed us to decide whether expectancy tendencies (represented
by the endorsement of unjust targets) and/or a response bias
(represented by the endorsement of unjust foils) were responsible
for the behavioral patterns of highly victim-sensitive persons.
In the unfair precue condition, the bivariate relation of victim
sensitivity and behavioral cooperation in the trust game was not
signiﬁcant (also see, Rothmund et al., 2011). It is important to
note that, despite the lack of a signiﬁcant bivariate correlation,
results were in accordance with our assumptions, as in the unfair
precue condition there was a signiﬁcant indirect eﬀect of victim
sensitivity on cooperation behavior via expectancies of unjust
outcomes.
Speciﬁcally, this study provided the ﬁrst evidence that the
tendency in highly victim-sensitive persons to exhibit heightened
expectancy of unjust outcomes contributes to the reluctance
to cooperate in situations that require trust. Consistent with
Hypothesis 2, in the unfair precue condition, there was a
signiﬁcant indirect eﬀect of victim sensitivity on cooperation
behavior mediated by the tendency to form expectancies of
injustice. There was no indirect eﬀect on behavior via the
endorsement of unjust foils, indicating that a response bias was
not relevant to the behavioral patterns of highly victim-sensitive
persons.
STUDY 2
The aim of Study 2 was to test the assumed causal relationship
between the tendency to form expectancies of injustice and
reduced cooperation behavior. We aimed to directly manipulate
the mediator variable of Study 1 by means of a training procedure
designed to induce diﬀerential expectancies concerning unjust vs.
just outcomes, and we tested the eﬀect of this manipulation on
behavioral cooperation in the trust game.
Method
Sample
Ninety-seven undergraduates (81% female; ages: 18–46 years;
M = 21.30, SD = 3.49) participated in a study on language
perception in return for partial course credit.
Procedure
Participants completed an online personality questionnaire that
included the items to measure victim sensitivity (Schmitt et al.,
2010) 2 weeks prior to their laboratory session. Upon arrival
in the laboratory, participants were seated at one of four
separated workplaces and randomly assigned to either the
unjust expectancy training condition (n = 49) or the control
condition (n = 48). They were instructed to work on a word
fragment completion task that will be explained below. In
the unjust expectancy training condition, this task aimed at
inducing a readiness to form expectancies of injustice. Afterward,
participants read ambiguous sentences and we assessed reaction
times to word fragments that indicated the occurrence of unjust
outcomes (unjust probe fragments), or just outcomes (just probe
fragments), or outcomes unrelated to (in)justice (neutral probe
fragments). In a subsequent trust game, we assessed cooperation
behavior. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion and then
debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
Materials
Justice Sensitivity
We used the same scale as in Study 1 to measure victim JS
(α = 0.89).
Expectancy training procedure
Twenty-four scenarios were constructed for use in the training
condition that were ambiguous with regard to whether an
unjust or just outcome would occur. Only the last words in
some sentences determined which outcome occurred. These
ﬁnal words were presented as fragments that participants had
to solve. In fact, every one of these fragments could be solved
only to yield words that indicated the occurrence of an unjust
outcome. Participants were instructed to use their understanding
of the sentence and to press a marked button on the keyboard
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as soon as they knew the solution to complete the fragments.
On the next screen, they typed in the missing letters and
received feedback on their performance. After each fragment
completion, a comprehension question followed. Participants
answered “correct” or “false” by pressing the corresponding
button as indicated by prompts on the screen. Half of the
questions were accurately answered by the response “correct,” the
other half by the response “false.” Again, participants received
feedback after they responded to the question.
An example of a scenario from the unjust expectancy training
condition is:
“In the cafeteria, three girls cut in line right in front of me. The
cashier notices and serves the g_rls f_ _st.” (correct solution: girls
ﬁrst)
Twenty-four scenarios were constructed for use in the control
version of this task. These materials were structured in a similar
way, but unrelated to (in)justice.
An example of a scenario from the control version of the task
is:
“In the cafeteria, a nice piece of cake catches my attention. The
cashier notices and recom_ _nds t_e cake.” (correct solution:
recommends the cake)
The assumption was that participants receiving the training
would learn to readily form expectancies of an unfair outcome,
through repeatedly completing fragments yielding unjust
outcomes in the described scenarios. Thus, they should anticipate
the unfair outcome of the sentence already during reading of
the ambiguous passage. By contrast, in the control condition
no such biased expectancy should be induced, given that the
content of these scenarios was unrelated to (in)justice. The
order of sentences and fragments was ﬁxed across participants.
Initially, three neutral practice trials were provided to assure the
understanding of the instructions.
Assessment of expectancy tendencies
The induction of expectancy tendencies by the training procedure
was measured with reaction times to solve additional fragmented
sentences that followed the training procedure and the control
condition in a ﬁxed order. For the participants, no diﬀerence
to the training material was apparent. They had to solve 12
probe fragments that ended ambiguous sentences, as with the
previous fragments. However, diﬀerent from the training task,
four of these probe fragments indicated an unjust outcome, four
a just outcome, and four further probe fragments resolved the
ambiguous sentence in a way unrelated to (in)justice. These
materials were used successfully by Baumert et al. (2012, Study
1, see also for examples) to assess biased expectancy of unjust
vs. just outcomes. The scenarios preceding the unjust and just
probe fragments werematched for length, and the fragments were
matched in number of missing letters. We recorded how long
participants took to press a marked button to continue to type
in the missing letters. These reaction times were taken to reveal
the degree to which expectancies of injustice (reactions times for
unjust probe fragments) or justice (reaction times for just probe
fragments) were formed when reading the ambiguous scenarios.
The reaction times for neutral probe fragments served as baseline.
Trust game
We used the same trust game as in Study 1. As before, only the
cooperation decision in the role of Person A was relevant for our
research questions and will be reported in the results section.
To reiterate our hypotheses in Study 2, we predicted that
participants in the unjust expectancy training condition would
solve unjust probe fragments (but not just and neutral probe
fragments) faster than participants in the control condition
(Hypothesis 3). Furthermore, in the role of person A in the trust
game, participants in the unjust expectancy training condition
(compared to the control condition) should allocate less money
to their partners (Hypothesis 4).
Results
Justice Sensitivity
Participants did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their victim sensitivity
between unjust expectancy training condition (M = 3.66,
SD = 0.85) and control condition (M = 3.88, SD = 0.92),
t(95) = −1.20, p = 0.23, d = 0.25.
Effects of Training on Readiness to Form
Expectancies of Injustice
Before separately aggregating the reaction times for unjust, just,
and neutral probe fragments, individual trials were omitted in
which participants did not complete the fragment correctly. In
general, error rates were very low for the diﬀerent types of
probes (3.35% for unjust; 2.83% for just; 2.35% for neutral probe
fragments). In addition, we corrected for extreme outliers by
omitting reaction times below 500 ms or above 15.000 ms (3.86%
for unjust; 4.64% for just; 1.17% for neutral probe fragments).
To test the eﬀectiveness of our training procedure we analyzed
the reaction times for probe fragments using a 2 (training
condition: unjust expectancy training/control) × 3 (probe type:
unjust/just/neutral) ANOVA with repeated measures on the
second factor. We found a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of probe type,
F(2,94) = 17.99, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.28, and a signiﬁcant probe
type × training condition interaction eﬀect, F(2,94) = 4.87,
p = 0.01, η2 = 0.09. As expected (Hypothesis 3), participants
in the unjust expectancy training condition came to solve unjust
probe fragments signiﬁcantly faster than did participants in
the control condition (see Table 2), t(95) = −3.05, p < 0.01,
one-tailed, d = 0.63. No such group diﬀerence was observed
on reaction times to just probe fragments, t(95) = −0.59,
p = 0.28, one-tailed, d = 0.12, or for neutral probe fragments,
t(95) = −1.21, p = 0.12, one-tailed, d = 0.25. An a posteriori
power analysis revealed 1-β = 0.78 for the interaction eﬀect with
η2 = 0.09, and 1-β = 0.92 for post hoc t-tests (one-tailed) with
d = 0.63.
Trust Game
Participants in the role of Person A on average transferred 70.4 ct
(SD = 27.6) of their initial amount of 100 ct to their anonymous
partner. Again, the value of this monetary transfer was our
measure of behavioral cooperation. As predicted (Hypothesis
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4), there was a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the conditions,
t(95) = −1.78, p = 0.04, one-tailed, d = 0.37, with participants in
the unjust expectancy training condition transferring less money
to their interaction partner than did participants in the control
condition (Table 2). For this eﬀect with d = 0.37 the power
analysis revealed 1-β = 0.57.
Discussion
The goal of Study 2 was to experimentally induce a group
diﬀerence in the readiness to form expectancies of unjust
outcomes in ambiguous situations by means of a training
procedure, in order to determine the causal impact of this
expectancy tendency on cooperation behavior.
Participants who received the unjust expectancy training
became faster (compared to the control condition) to complete
word fragments that resolved the ambiguity by indicating
an unjust outcome. There were no diﬀerences between the
conditions in the reaction times to word fragments indicating
just outcomes, or outcomes unrelated to (in)justice (Hypothesis
3). This represents evidence that participants in the training
condition learned to readily form expectancies of unjust
outcomes in ambiguous situations. Importantly, we found that
participants in the unjust expectancy training (compared to the
control condition) were signiﬁcantly less cooperative in the trust
game in the role of Person A (Hypothesis 4). Having learned
to readily expect unjust outcomes in ambiguous situations,
participants likely expected their anonymous interaction partner
to exploit them and, consequently, reduced their cooperation.
Importantly, this study provides a rigorous test of the assumption
that the readiness to form expectancies of unjust outcomes
can causally contribute to reduced behavioral cooperation in
circumstances that require trust in others.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We investigated how dispositional victim sensitivity shapes
cooperation behavior, to test the validity of hypotheses derived
from the SeMI model (Gollwitzer et al., 2013). We tested the
notion that victim-sensitive persons have a disproportionate
TABLE 2 | Mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of reaction times
for unjust, just, and neutral probe fragments, and cooperation in the trust






Unjust probe fragments 3636 (999) 4352 (1297)
Just probe fragments 4094 (1157) 4240 (1243)
Neutral probe fragments 4447 (1011) 4713 (1150)
Cooperation trust game 65.4 (30.8) 75.3 (23.5)
Unjust probe fragments = mean reaction times for unjust probe fragments (ms).
Just probe fragments = mean reaction times for just probe fragments (ms).
Neutral probe fragments = mean reaction times for neutral probe fragments (ms).
Cooperation trust game = investment in the role of Person A (in Cent) in the trust
game.
tendency to form expectancies that others harbor mean
intentions, and that this pattern of expectancies causally
contributes to their withdrawal of cooperation in socially
uncertain situations.
In Study 1 we found evidence in support of central
assumptions of the SeMI model, namely that under conditions
that cue activation of a suspicious mindset, information
processing of high victim-sensitive persons is characterized
by the tendency to form expectancies of injustice. In line
with Hypothesis 1A, we found highly (compared to lowly)
victim-sensitive persons who had previously experienced an
unfairness exhibited stronger expectancy for unjust outcomes.
When activation of a suspicious mindset was not cued by prior
unfairness, there was no eﬀect of victim sensitivity on expectancy
for unjust outcomes.
In sum, these ﬁndings suggest that people high in victim
sensitivity exhibit a heightened tendency to form expectancies
of injustice in speciﬁc situations. However, it cannot be
completely ruled out that highly victim-sensitive persons might
be (additionally) characterized by a tendency to regard the
world as a generally unjust place. In other words, they might
show a response bias, since there was a marginally signiﬁcant
relationship to the endorsement of unjust foils in the unfair
precue condition. Yet, ﬁndings of the moderated mediation
analyses showed that only expectancies of injustice of highly
victim-sensitive persons causally contributed to their reduced
cooperation. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, there was a signiﬁcant
indirect eﬀect of victim sensitivity on cooperation behavior in the
unfair precue condition, and this association was mediated by
the tendency to form expectancies of injustice. Apparently, in the
trust game, victim-sensitive persons tended to expect an unjust
outcome and, in turn, avoided to make themselves vulnerable for
exploitation.
This result might contribute important knowledge to the
current debate about the acceptance and solidarity for refugees
coming to Europe. It can be expected that Europeans high in
victim sensitivity will be particularly reluctant to show solidarity
and to welcome refugees, because they are suspicious that their
benevolence could be exploited and that they would suﬀer
therefore deprivation later on. Future studies are necessary to
investigate this important psychological mechanism in similar
phenomena that occur in daily life.
Interestingly, in the control condition there was a signiﬁcant
positive correlation between victim sensitivity and behavioral
cooperation (see Table 1), but there was no evidence that this
was mediated by expectancy tendencies. One might speculate
that fairness concerns are decisive in this situation. Possibly,
the prior experience of a fair outcome may have suppressed
the activation of the suspicious mindset. Gollwitzer et al. (2005)
argued that highly victim-sensitive persons might experience a
motivational conﬂict when their suspicious mindset is activated:
they have a strong concern for justice, but since exploitation is
particularly aversive for them, they have also a strong fear of being
exploited. Future studies could investigate this issue by testing if
the suppression of the suspicious mindset mediates the positive
association between victim sensitivity and prosocial behavior in
situations where fair treatment has been experienced.
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To enrich these ﬁndings and to identify causal relationships,
we induced expectancies of unjust outcomes in ambiguous
situations, in order to test the causal impact of such expectancies
on behavioral cooperation. This is an important contribution to
understand the underlying processes of cooperation behavior,
since correlation evidence from Study 1 shows only that
expectancy tendencies are associated with this kind of behavioral
reactions. Without the experimental manipulation of expectancy,
it would not be possible to distinguish alternative causal accounts
of the observed mediation eﬀect, such as the reversed pattern
of causality with frequently displayed uncooperative behavior
shaping expectancies regarding the likelihood of unfair outcomes,
which in turn might inﬂuence levels of victim sensitivity over
time.
Speciﬁcally, results suggest that reduced cooperation in the
trust game, observed among victim-sensitive persons (e.g.,
Gollwitzer andRothmund, 2011) can be induced bymanipulating
expectancy tendencies. We provided strong evidence for the
assumed causal relationship. The observed impact of our training
procedure indicated that there is potential to modify tendencies
to form expectancies of injustice in ambiguous situations by
means of speciﬁc interventions that could have therapeutic
application. Thus, we have laid the foundation for training-based
interventions to enhance cooperation by directly targeting for
change in the underlying cognitive processes that translate this
disposition into potentially maladaptive behavior.
It remains to be seen whether directly training increased
expectancy of just outcomes would result in the enhancement
of cooperation in real world settings. Testing the causal impact
of a just expectancy training condition on cooperation behavior
will be a meaningful ﬁrst step. Further research should determine
if the tendency to expect injustice displayed by high victim-
sensitive persons can be permanently reduced through extended
training to yield a beneﬁcial increase in cooperative behavior.
One study that has taken a preliminary step in this direction
showed that participants acted more prosocially in an economic
game after being trained to expect own unjustiﬁed advantages
(Maltese et al., 2013). Highly victim-sensitive persons may beneﬁt
from a similar prosocial training that directs their thoughts on
disadvantaged others and away from the expectancy of own
disadvantages resulting from the perception of others mean
intentions.
On a more general level, our results emphasize the
importance of illuminating the patterns of information
processing that translate latent dispositions into overt
behavior. Until now, most studies tested only bivariate
correlations between personality traits and information
processing patterns (e.g., Rusting, 1998). Importantly, we
substantially extended this approach by investigating moderated
mediations, showing how the interaction between personality
and situation shapes information processing which leads
to diﬀerences in behavioral reactions. Furthermore, we
were also able to show the causal relationship between the
information processing of victim-sensitive persons and their
cooperation behavior. This approach should encourage further
studies in social justice research, as well as in other areas of
psychology.
Limitations
Despite their strengths, our studies also have certain limitations.
First, we tested behavioral cooperation only in the trust game.
Thus, it remains to be seen whether our results generalize
to cooperative behavior in social dilemma situations (e.g.,
Gollwitzer et al., 2009), in public goods games (e.g., Hilbig
et al., 2012), or in real-life situations where cooperation is
required (e.g., solidarity with refugees). In all these situations,
the identiﬁed pattern of activation of a suspicious mindset and
formation of expectancies concerning the prospect of just vs.
unjust outcomes should be relevant as mediator for behavioral
reactions.
Second, the methods employed to assess and manipulate
expectancies of injustice in Studies 1 and 2 were not
identical. In Study 1, we measured the tendency to form
expectancies of unjust outcomes by assessing the endorsement
of targets indicating unjust outcomes for previously encoded
scenarios. To experimentally induce a tendency to expect
unjust outcomes in Study 2, we used a fragment completion
training task, and assessed the impact of this training on
expectancy by measuring reaction times to solve fragmented
words indicating just and unjust outcomes for events described
in preceding sentences. Such diﬀerences between the tasks
introduce the possibility that in Study 2 we may have
manipulated somewhat diﬀerent expectancy processes from
those we measured in Study 1. Nevertheless, we believe our
results speak in favor of the option that assessment and
manipulation tapped into similar tendencies, showing the
importance of expectancies of injustice for reactions in the trust
game.
Third, while we have shown that the heightened tendency of
highly victim-sensitive persons to form expectancies of injustice
mediates the association between victim sensitivity and reduced
behavioral cooperation, it is plausible that other processes also
may contribute to the mediation of this relationship. It would be
fruitful for further studies to investigate possible other mediating
processes (e.g., availability of legitimizing cognitions) to extend
understanding of the pathways through which victim sensitivity
serves to compromise cooperative behavior.
Fourth, the power for the eﬀects of victim sensitivity on
expectancies of injustice and of the expectancy training on
cooperation behavior did not correspond to the conventions of
1-β = 0.80. As has been shown, underpowered studies may lead
to an increased likelihood of false positive ﬁndings (Button et al.,
2013). For this reason, a replication with a bigger sample size is
necessary in order to raise conﬁdence in the robustness of the
revealed eﬀect.
CONCLUSION
In two studies we provided evidence for hypotheses derived from
the SeMI model that describes the underlying processes
translating dispositional victim sensitivity into reduced
cooperation behavior. Our ﬁndings suggest that in highly
victim-sensitive persons the activation of a suspicious mindset
in response to perceived unfairness increases the tendency to
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form expectancies of injustice, which mediates the withdrawal
of behavioral cooperation. By manipulating the tendency to
form expectancies of injustice we were able to show that such
expectancy exerts a causal inﬂuence on cooperation behavior.
These ﬁndings enrich the theoretical conceptualization of the
SeMI model, and extend application for social justice research in
ways that could be fruitful for other areas of psychology. These
studies also pave the way for future applied research designed to
enhance cooperative behavior in people with high levels of victim
sensitivity.
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